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Introduction
Sin ce the structural reforms of 1985, the C omm on A gricultural Policy has placed in creasing em phasis on targe ting paym en ts to farme rs away from food production related paymen ts, and tow ard s area paym en ts and dire ct income support. Paym en ts for environ mental goods produced by the farm sector from European Union (EU ) agricultural min istry budgets ®rst became possible in 0964-0568/99/010023-21 Ó1999 U niversity of Newcastle upon Tyne 1985, and the U K adopted its E nvironmen tally Sensitive A reas (E SA ) scheme tw o ye ars later. A gri-en viron mental p olicies such as the E SA sche m e can now be found in m an y EU countries (for a su rve y, see O E C D , 1996) , an d m ay be justi®ed on a num ber of grou nd s: th at they pay farm ers to produce environm ental public good s w h ich w ould otherw ise be under-supp lie d from the poin t of view of econom ic ef®ciency (H anley et al., 1998a) ; and /or that they offer a means of sup portin g farm in comes w ithout in creasin g food prod uction, an d thus add in g to the costs of disposin g of ex cess supp lie s at the E U level. G iven that these sche mes are costly, though, both in term s of foregone outp ut an d exche quer costs, attention has recen tly been dire cted at measu rin g the econ om ic value of the environm ental bene®ts of such policies (W illis et al., 1993) .
The C ontinge nt Valuation Method (CVM) is now one of the m ost comm on valuation methods in use in both Europe and the USA . W illingne ss to pay (W TP) amounts can be estim ated using a number of differen t des igns in C VM , the most comm on of w hich are open-ended (OE) and dichotomous choice (DC ). D C design s are know n, on the w hole , to result in highe r mean W TP values than O E desig ns . Brow n et al. (1996) summ arize res ults from 11 C VM survey s w hich com pared formats and found that, in all cases, DC mean W TP exceede d O E mean W TP, w ith the ratio of DC /O E varyin g from 1.12 to 4.78. This differen ce is partly due to the phen omenon of`yea-saying ', and partly due to prefere nce uncertainty (Ready et al., 1996; Brow n et al., 1996) . Eviden ce from Loomis (1990) suggests that O E design s outperform DC on tem poral stability grounds, w hilst Brow n et al. (1996) found that D C design s resulted in a gre ater hypothetical marke t error (in other w ords, res ulted in a greater differen ce between stated and actual W TP) than an O E equivalent. The re are thus ground s for preferrin g O E to DC desig ns , as offerin g a more conserv ative design of survey. In contrast, familiar claims are that D C design s are more realistic, are easier for res ponden ts to answer, and are incen tive-compatible (H oehn & Rand all, 1987) . The`trum p card ' usually playe d by proponents of D C design s is that the N O AA 1 pane l recommende d a DC design , although this con¯icts w ith another of their recommendations, that of conservative survey design choices. A ccording ly, the empirical study on w hich this paper is based used both D C and OE desig ns for C VM . This paper reports on the outcome of the O E study, and commen ts on some econometric issues raised by this desig n. W e report elsew here on the D C study, and on a choice experim en t application to the same case studies (H anley et al., 1998b ). An important part of the OE C VM exercise is the estim ation of bid curve s. Bid curve s (that is, a statistical relationsh ip between W TP and variables though t to in¯uence its magn itude) are usually estim ated for three reasons . The ®rst is as a test of theoretical valid ity, w hich inv olves che ckin g w he ther sign s on explanatory variables (such as income) are in accord w ith a priori expectations. The second is as a test of discrim inant valid ity, by checkin g w he ther bids are sim ply rand om num bers, or can be explained statistically to a satisfactory leve l using variations in other variables collected as part of the survey (such as age , in come and education).`Satisfactory' is usually de®ned either w ith respect to R 2 values found in other published C V studies, or M itchell & C arson 's benchm ark of 15% . Estimating the Bene ®ts of A gri-environm ental Policy 25 study' site to represe nt values at a second`policy' site . Transferrin g unadjusted W TP values is also possib le. W ith respect to the ®rst and last of these reasons, a main feature of inte rest is the estim ated impact of certain in depen den t variables on an ind ivid ual's W TP for a given environ men tal good or service. For example, W TP for environ mental bene®ts is typically an in creasing function of househ old in come. The in come elasticity of W TP has been estim ated at values typically falling in the 1 0.5 to 1 0.75 range (Brisson , 1996) . Find ing intuitive ly and/or theoretically corre ct sign s on variables such as in come in the bid curve is one test for the validity of C VM results. Estim ating the correct magn itude of partial effects of independe nt variables on W TP is important for bene ®ts trans fer and for other policy questions .
The purpose of this paper is to report on estim ates of W TP for the en vironmental bene®ts of one element of U K agri-en vironm en tal policy, namely ESAs, and in the process to consider some econometric m odellin g issue s in the estim ation of bid curve s. We concentrate on a sample-selection approach to do this, w he reb y we seek to disting uish different decisions w hich a potential CVM surve y responden t m ust take in formulating a W TP bid. These decisions are w hether to protest, w hether to give a positive bid and how m uch to bid. This modellin g approach allow s us to`decompose' the m argin al effects of one inde penden t variable on W TP in to separable effects on these different stages, using a procedure ®rst outlined by M cDonald & M of®tt (1980) .
The remain der of this paper is organized as follow s. In the next section we outline the nature of W TP bids, and show brie¯y how`self-selection' can create econometric problems in bid curve estim ation. W e also note some problem s reg ard ing in complete resp onses, prim arily w ith respect to income. In the third section, the m ain relev ant features of the ESA schem e, and the tw o case study sites , are outlined . In the fourth section, we give details on the desig n and descriptive results from the C VM survey . The ®fth section comments on the res ults obtained from a number of bid curve models, w hilst a ®nal section offers some conclusions.
Econ om e tric Issue s
The basic ide a behind the estim ation of bid curve s is to relate a measure of w illing ne ss to pay, p, for an en vironm en tal change to a set of explanatory factors. That is:
(1) w here : X 5 X1, X2, ¼ , Xk is a vector of variables though t to in¯uence the amount an ind ivid ual is w illing to pay to bene ®t from a certain en vironm en tal improvement or to avoid a certain en vironm en tal deg radation. It is comm on to estim ate this relation sh ip as a linea r reg ression equation of the form usin g an (assumed ) rand om sam ple of ind ivid uals:
(2) p 5 b9X 1 « w here : b is a vector of unkn ow n paramete rs and « is a rand om error term assumed to be normally distributed w ith a zero mean and constant variance. The estim ated parameters of this relationsh ip are im portant; their signs indicate the direction s of the association between , say, income and W TP, and their sizes ind icate the stre ng th or magn itude of these associations. That is, for variables that are continuous in measureme nt:
w here : p/X k is the partial deriv ative of p w ith respect Xk, w hich represen ts an estim ate of the effect of a change in a given explanatory variable on w illin gne ss to pay holdin g constant the effect of the other variables included in the equation.
Despite the empirical sim plicity of equation (2), there are tw o problem s that emerge in practise w he n estim ating bid curves in such a manner. The ®rst is that in m ost C VM studies a sign i®cant proportion of res ponden ts usually report`zero bids'. The second is that there is often a substantial amount of m iss ing in formation on some of the explanatory variables. A s is argued below , the w ay these tw o iss ues are treated empirically may be problem atic and casts some doubt on the valid ity of the paramete r estim ates of W TP equations of the type described in equation (2).
Zero bid resp onses to open-en ded w illin gne ss to pay question s m ay be categorized into one of three types . The ®rst are`gen uine zero bids' w here the res ponden t indicates that she is not w illin g to pay anyth ing for the good or service in question, because she does not value it. The second are`protest bids', w here the resp ondent tende rs a zero bid for reasons other than placing a zero value (i.e. not being w illing to pay any thin g) on the good in question . This may be, for example, because she disapproves of the prin ciple of paying for en vironmental protection sin ce she belie ves it should be req uired by law . The third arè don't kn ow ' responses, w he re the in dividual is sim ply uncertain as to the amount she is w illing to pay (this amount of course may also be zero).
The fact that these`zero bids' do not necessarily mean that an in dividual is unw illin g to pay anyth ing has led to ad hoc estim ation practises. In many W TP studies, in divid uals w ho report zero bids are excluded and equation (2) is estim ated only for individ uals w ho tender positive bids. Or, equation (2) is estim ated for in dividuals w ho report positive bids and gen uine zero bids, w ith ind ivid uals w ho tender protest bids or w ho give`don't know ' resp onses being excluded. Both these strategies are prob lematic sin ce the w illing ne ss to pay equation is estim ated on w hat may term ed a`self-selected sample'Ð a form of sample selection bias.
The second problem men tione d above relates to the treatment of ind ivid uals for w hom some information is missing in the data set for a sub-set of explanatory variables. It is genera lly belie ved (for obvious economic reasons) that income is one of the key variables in explaining differences across individ uals in their w illin gnes s to pay for goods and serv ices. Income is also one of the question s that individuals tend to be reluctant to answ er, and in practise this reluctance leads to a sign i®cant item non-response rates for income questions in C VM surve ys. For example, in the tw o surveys that we carrie d out (discussed below ), 11.3% and 19.6% of ind ivid uals surveyed did not give resp onses to the income question. In the estim ation of bid curves it is common to exclude those ind ivid uals w ho do not res pond to the questions used to construct the variables that are in cluded in X in equation (2). This strategy w ould not be problematic if those individuals w ho do not report such inform ation are a random sub-sample of all in dividuals surveyed . H owever, this is unlike ly to be the case for sen sitive' variables such as income. For example, it is well know n that individuals w ho have high incomes have a lower propensity to report their in come on Downloaded by [University of Kent] at 03:43 07 January 2014
Estimating the Bene ®ts of A gri-environm ental Policy 27 surve ys (i.e. have a higher non-response rate). If ind ivid uals w ho have higher income have a highe r (or for that m atter lower) w illing ne ss to pay, excluding ind ivid uals w ith missin g income information from the estim ation of equation (2) w ill lead to a biased estim ate of the effect of income on w illin gness to pay (and biased estim ates of the parameters of the other variables). In other w ords, missin g information on the explanatory variables of in teres t may result in the estim ation of w illing ne ss to pay equations w ith sam ples w hose values on explanatory variables do not re¯ect those of the population of in teres t, a furthe r source of sample selection bias. Several methods have developed for addressin g such biases.
In orde r to dem onstrate the problem that results from sample selection bias more form ally, let j 5 1, 2,¼ , J den ote individ uals w ho report a`valid ' w illin gness to pay (i.e. p $ 0); let k 5 1, 2, ¼ , K denote ind ivid uals w ho do not report a valid w illin gne ss to pay (i.e. protest bids and`don't kn ow ' response s); and let i 5 1, 2, 3, ¼ , N w here N 5 J 1 K . The population regress ion equation of the w illing ne ss to pay equation is the expectation of equation (2):
(N ote the subscript i). H owever, because of protest bids and`don't kn ow ' res ponses, observations on p are only available for a sub-sample of N That is, only for p $ 0 or sample J. In other w ords, the regre ssion equation for thè sele cted' sample is the expectation:
(N ote the subscript j). If the conditional expectation of «j is zero, then the reg ression equation for the selected sample (i.e. equation (5)) w ill be the same as the population reg ression equation (i.e. equation (4)). In this case, ordinary least squares (OLS) may be used to ge nerate an unbiased estim ate of the parameter vector b using only observations from the selected (J) sample. If, however, the sample selection process is non-rand om , equation (4) w ill not be the same as equation (5). The reason is, sim ply, that the mean of the error term w ill not be zero (i.e. E(«j) Þ 0) and the estim ates of b w ill be conseq uently biased .
Heckman (1976, 1979) has recast the problem of sam ple selection bias as an omitted variable problem and has proposed w hat is an extreme ly popular econometric correction. Heckman's econometric procedure esse ntially involves modellin g the sample selection mechanism and then using these estim ates tò purge ' the equation of interes t of degra ding selection effects (i.e. the equation estim ated on the selecte d sample).
In order to dem onstrate Heckm an's method in the context of estim ating a bid curve , let zi* be a latent variable that determ ines w hether or not an individ ual give s a valid w illin gness to pay response (i.e. p $ 0). This latent variable may be related to a set of explanatory factors as a line ar equation of the form:
(6) zi* 5 a9Zi 1 mi w here : Zi 5 Z1, Z2, ¼ , Zr is a vector of variables thought to in¯uence w he ther or not an ind ivid ual bids p $ 0; a is a set of unkn ow n parameters to be estim ated; and mi is assumed to be norm ally distributed w ith a zero mean and constant variance. In this m odel zi* is not observe d. W hat is observed is an indicator variable, zi, that takes on a value of 1 if pi $ 0 and value of 0 if not. Based on equation (6) we m ay construct a`selection equation' w hich dete rm ine s inclusion in the sample that is used to estim ate the w illin gness to pay equation. If zi* . 0 then zi 5 1 and p is observed (i.e. p $ 0). If on the other hand, zi* # 0 then zi 5 0 and p is not observed (e.g. protest bid). Estim ates of equation (6) are used to construct the inverse of the M ill's ratio, often referred to as`Heckm an's l':
w here Á(.) is the stand ard normal den sity function (pdf) and F(.) is the standard normal cumulative dens ity function (cdf). This`new ' variable is then included in the w illingne ss to pay equationÐ the`structural equation'Ð as an additional reg ressor:
w here g is the covariance between the error term s in the selection equation and w illing ne ss to pay equation. Equation (8) Although Heckman's tw o-step procedure can be used as a possible control for selection bias, it ign ores the fact that the w illin gness to pay variable p is à censore d' depe nde nt variable. The censoring problem w ith respect to estim ation of w illin gness to pay equations has tw o dime ns ions. The ®rst is that there is a real lower boundÐ it is typically not possib le to bid less than zero. The second is that there is often`heaping' on the lower boundÐ often a sign i®cant proportion of individ uals make zero bids . For example, in the tw o survey s that we carrie d out (discusse d below ), 36.8% and 46.6% of individuals m ade zero bids. Failure to account for the concentration of observations at the lim it value can res ult in m isleading estim ates of the parameters of the explanatory variables of inte rest (e.g. parameters estim ated usin g OLS).
Ignorin g the sample selection issue for the momen t, Tobin (1958) argue d that it is useful to think of ex planatory variables in¯uencing both the probability of the lim it response and the size of the non-limit res ponse. M ore speci®cally in term s of the w illin gness -to-pay decision, the ®rst is the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of making a positive bid and the second is the impact on the am ount bid. M ore formally : (9) pi* 5 b9X 1 « w here : pi* is an unobserved latent variable unde rly ing p; and « is an error term w ith the usual propertie s. Let Li be the lower lim it (e.g. in the case of w illin gne ss to pay the lower lim it is zero). If pi* # Li then pi 5 Li, and the observation is cens ored at the lower lim it (i.e. pi 5 0). If on the other hand, pi* $ Li then pi 5 pi* ( 5 b9X 1 «), and pi is observed . There fore, the expected value of p is:
where the ®rst term on the right-hand side is the probability that p is positive and the second term is the expected value of p given that p is some positive value.
In term s of the regres sion notation used above this expectation may be expressed as:
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U nfortunately the para meters of the T obit m odel are m ore d if®cult to in terpret th an in the case of a sim p le line ar regression. They do not (as some have un fortu nately assu med) rep resent the effect of a ch ange in a given ex planatory variable on the dependen t varia ble of in terest (i.e. p/Xk). M c-D onald & M of®tt (1980) dem onstrate that an in form ative w ay to present the results of a Tobit regression is to decom p ose the effect of an ex planatory variable (or a serie s of ex pla natory variables) into tw o com pone nts. T he ®rs t is the im pact on the probability of bein g above the lim it an d the second is the im p act on the dependent variable if it is alre ad y above the lim it. M ore form ally :
w here E(p*) is the expected value of p conditional on being above the lim it and all other term s have been de®ned above. In term s of the w illin gness to pay problem , the ®rst term on the righ t-hand side of equation (12) is the im pact of the explanatory variable on the probability of a positive bid and the second term is the im pact on the am ount bid (conditional on a positive bid in the ®rst place). There fore, the relative magn itudes of these tw o components is of substantive importance.
The extension of the Tobit model to include sample selection is straigh tforw ard . The expected value of the Tobit model w ith selection is:
w here as above z is an ind icator variable that equals 1 if p is observed and 0 if not. The probability that p . 0 and z 5 1 is:
w here : F2 is the bivariate normal probability distribution and r is the covariance between the error term s in the selection equation (i.e. equation (6)) and the error term in the structural Tobit equation (i.e. equation (9)). The expected value of p give n that p . 0 and z 5 1 is:
The corresponding Tobit-like expression for the selected sample (analogous to equation (9)) is the product of equation (14) and equation (15). A fter some manipulation this express ion may be w ritten :
w here h 5 2 b9X/s«; k 5 2 a9Z; and d 5 2 1/(1 2 r 2 ) 2 2 . U nlike Heckm an's tw ostep procedure, the selection equation and structural equation are estim ated jointly by the meth od of m aximum like lih ood (see Greene , 1993 , for estimation details). It is straigh tforw ard to adapt the Tobit model w ith selection to include information on explanatory variables of central theoretical importance that have missin g inform ation, such as in come, in the estim ation of bid curve s. In orde r to do this, one has to specify the selection mechanism in a sligh tly different w ay. M ore speci®cally , the sele ction mechanism w he n income reporting is ign ored is a model of the probability that a valid bid (i.e. ge nuine zero or positive ) is tende red, compared to a protes t bid w hen all individ uals w ith missing in come information are excluded from the estim ation. H owever, the selection mechanism w he n income non-reported is in cluded in the estim ation is a model of the join t probability that a valid bid is tendered and income is reported .
The use of the Tobit estim ator to obtain bid curves is, of course, not uncommon in open-ended C VM studies , since this approach recognizes the censore d nature of W TP values (see, for example, H anle y & C raig, 1991; Kaoru, 1993) . H owever, the modelling of sample selection is far less common. The only exam ple the authors are aw are of is Kaoru (1993) w ho includes a Heckm an-type selection equation in his estim ation of W TP for w ater quality bene ®ts in the M artha's Vine yard area of New Eng land. Of 559 m ailed out questionnaires, 200 were returne d w ith complete socio-economic information. O f these 200 responses, 25 gave a zero W TP value and 30 resp onses were protest bids. Kaoru estim ates a sele ction equation comparin g positive W TP bids w ith (zero plus protest) bids. H owever, only income w as sign i®cant in the selection equation, w hilst the coef®cient on the in verse M ills w as in sign i®cant. Kaoru does not model income non -responses, nor does he employ the M cD onald/M of®tt decom position. H is approach is therefore very differen t to ours.
A gri-e nviron m e ntal Policy and the C ase Study A re as
The data used in this paper relate to a contingen t valuation study of tw o Environm en tally Sensitive A reas in Scotland , carried out on behalf of the Scottish O f®ce durin g 1994±96 (for full details, see H anley et al., 1996) . ESA s were established under Article 19 of EC Structures Regulation 797/85 in 1985, as part of the early reform of the C om mon Agricultural Policy. They are design ated areas of the country w hich are of special landscape and /or conserv ation inte rest w here traditional farm in g meth ods are considere d to be essen tial to maintaining w ild life and landscape quality.
In Scotland , 10 ESAs have been des ignated sin ce 1987, coverin g some 1.4 million ha of farm land. Farm ers may`join' an ESA sche me by signing a 10-year agreeme nt based on a plan w hich mee ts the conservation aims and objectives of the particular ES A. In return for agreein g to these restrictions on activities, farme rs qualify for annual per hectare payme nts on tw o differen t levels: tier one (aime d at the preservation of conservation features at ex istin g levels); and tier tw o (aimed at enhancemen t and extension of conse rvation features beyond existin g levels). ESAs thus in volve the state paying farmers to produce en vironmental public goods, in term s of w ild life and land scape quality, a notion w hich ®nd s many echoes throughout the O EC D (H anley et al., 1998a) .
This study w as concerne d w ith tw o ESAs, Breadalb ane, in H igh land Perth sh ire , and The M achair of the U ists, Benbecula, Barra and Vatersay (`The M achair', from now on) in the Western Isles. Breadalbane ESA com prises 179 284 ha of mountain s and valle y lands. Land cover features com prise grasslands, heather moorland , wetlands, and birch and ash w oodland s, w ith increasin g amounts of conifer plantation in upland areas. Farm ing is a m ixture of upland shee p and suckler cows plus intensive grassland cultivation on in-bye land. ESA payme nts are conditional on the manageme nt of broadleaved and native w oodland s, wetlands, he rb rich pasture, heather moorland, dyke s, hed ge s and archaeological features . The main objectives of the ESA programme are to conse rve and extend these features. The M achair ESA is spre ad over 15 166 ha of coastal plain Downloaded by [University of Kent] at 03:43 07 January 2014
Estimating the Bene ®ts of A gri-environm ental Policy 31 on ®ve islands . Land cover in cludes grassland s, cultivated machair, dune sy stem s and rough pasture. C rofting activities are centred around sm all scale crop and live stock production, and have resulted in high¯oristic diversity on the m achair land s. Rare bree ding bird s, such as the corncrake, are found in The M achair, and the conse rvation requireme nts of the ESA program me here may be thought of as an attempt to preserve and extend farm ing practices w hich result in favourable conditions for these bird s 2 and¯owers .
The ESA prescrip tions w ill produce quite com plex change s in¯ora, fauna and land scape, and w ill also have implications for archaeological features not protected under existing legisla tion. Tw o stage s were thus in volved in deve loping Inform ation Packs to be used as part of the C VM survey: prediction of changes to these features; and represen tation of these change s, in the form of w ith/w ithout scenarios .
W ith regard to pred iction , the la nd area w ithin each E SA w as d ivid ed up in to km 2 la nd class types, usin g the In stitute of Terre stria l E cology's lan d classi®cation system (Institute for Terre stria l E cology , 1991). This he lped the organization of environ mental and land m anage ment data for each E SA , and allow ed the extrapolation of predicted conser vation values across each ESA . C lassifyin g la nd in this w ay gave six m ajor types for Breadalb ane , an d tw o for T he M achair. For each class, w e pred icted ch ange s in land cover res ultin g from change s in m an age ment (for ex am ple, from change s in stockin g rates or fertilizer use), usin g the N ational Vege tation C la ssi®cation system for vege tative cover. C hange s w ere p red icted usin g succession m odels (see Sim pson e t al., 1997, for furth er details). The im p act of these like ly biological succession s on the conservation status of ea ch land class (in term s of pla nt com m unities) w as then assesse d, usin g three crite ria: biod iversity (num ber of species m 2 ); presence/absen ce of ke y ind icator species; and relative ra rity of the N V Z com m unity. T he se pred iction s w ere also d iscussed w ith local agricu ltura l advisors and farmers . C han ge s in bird n um bers/species type w ere predicted in con su ltation w ith the Royal Society for the Protection of B ird s, the Scottish O f®ce A gricultu re, En vir on ment and Fishe ries Dep artm ent, an d Scottish N atura l H erita ge . C h ange s in archaeological features w ere p red icted in consultation w ith H istoric Scotlan d. T he se chan ges w ere all then set in the contex t of w ith and w ith out the E SA prescriptions, by p red ictin g like ly chan ge s in the absence of the sche me. Representation of these pred icted chan ge s w as accom plis he d by p roducin g Inform ation Packs for each E SA . T he se accom p anied the C V M questionnaire s, w hich ga ve background details on the E SA sche me in ge ne ra l. C h ange s were show n as w ith and w ith out the ESA schem e in p lace, usin g colour ph otogra ph p airs w hich w ere m anipula ted usin g A d obe Photosh op. For Breadalb ane , change s to the ap peara nce of farm la nd and m oorla nd, to archaeological features and to the num ber and types of¯ow ers w ere in cluded . For T he M achair, change s to the m ach air la nds, bird s,¯ow er d iversity, dune s and arch aeological features w ere portraye d . In summary, the ESA schem e, if continued, w ill ge ne rate environ mental improvem en ts in both areas relative to the`no ESA ' case. These improvemen ts are in term s of more attractive land scapes, the protection of rare and well-loved bird s and¯ora, and the protection of archaeological site s. Responden ts learn about w hat they are`buying ' in the inform ation packs, w hich use w ords and pictures to com pare the situation w ith and w ithout the ESA scheme in place.
Responde nts m ight therefore be reasonably expected to be very clear about the change in the quantity of the environ mental good w hich the survey addresses .
De sign and De scriptive Re sults of the C V M Surve y
A n initial`attitudes' survey of 150 respondents sh owed that in come tax in creases were the second m ost preferred bid veh icle after entrance fees.
3 H owever, entrance fees were reje cted for the main surve y bid vehicle as: (1) im practical, due to the physical impossibility of excludin g users from the areas; and (2) as excluding non -use values. The attitudes survey also revealed that a majority of the sample (70%) were in favour of farmers being paid by governm en t to produce both food and environ mental outputs. Some 32% of the sample had heard of the ESA programme, w hils t 69% were in favour of paying for en vironmental improveme nts in these areas. In subseq uent focus groups, no objections were made to the use of income tax as the preferre d bid veh icle. The target populations for the main survey were three-fold: the UK ge ne ral public; residen ts in the tw o ESAs, and visitors to each ESA . Focus groups 4 were used to develop the w ording and layout of the survey in strume nts (including the Information Packs) and a pilot study w as carrie d out prior to the main surve y. In genera l, the survey desig n follow s N OA A guide lines, except that we obtained both open-en ded and dichotom ous choice bid responses, as the latter are well-know n to result in highe r W TP values than the former, due tò yea-saying ' and preferen ce uncertainty ; and in that both mail-sh ot and in-person intervie w responses were obtaine d. Response rates for the mail shot were good by CVM standards, bein g greater than 50% in alm ost all sub-sam ples.
Responde nts were repeatedly rem in ded that they were being asked their W TP for the environ men tal improvem en ts at one ESA only, and that extra spen ding w ould be necessary for all other ESAs and for all other environ mental policies. Estimating the Bene ®ts of A gri-environm ental Policy 33 elapsed , to che ck on w hat Berg land et al., refer to as the ªtemporal stabilityº of C VM estim ates. Some deb ate ex ists on w he ther it is preferable to re-survey the same in divid uals as in the main survey , or a differen t group draw n rand om ly from the same population. The latter approach w as used he re, w ith 200 questionn aire s being sent to a different random sample draw n from the ge ne ral public population three months after the main survey w as completed. This sample yielded a 45% resp onse rate, w ith a mean W TP of £23.39 for Breadalbane. This is ins igni®cantly differen t from the m ain survey result; median W TP w as iden tical in both sam ples. The test±rete st procedure thus fails to reje ct the null hy pothesis of temporal stability in the open-ended C VM survey.
Second, a test of`scope' w as used, as recommended in the N OA A report. This inv olves examining w hether W TP is sen sitive to the quantity of the en viron mental good being bid for. The null hypothesis is that mean W TP is incre asin g in the quantity of the environ mental good. Accordingly, a sub-sample of res ponden ts (n 5 220) were sent information packs on both ESA s, and aske d their maximum W TP for a programme to main tain the ESA s in both areas at once. This`double information pack' sub-sample is therefore expected to yield a highe r mean W TP than bids for either ESA in isolation. This w as the result obtained . Mean W TP for both ESAs valued together w as highe r at £36.00 than for eithe r ESA w hen valued alone (the relev ant ®gure s bein g £25.21 for Breadalbane and £13.44 for The M achair). The null hy pothesis cannot thus be rejected. H owever, W TP for both ESAs combined is less than the sum of W TP for both ESA s valued inde penden tly; this may be eviden ce of a ne sting effect, brough t about through substitution possibilities.
B id C urve Re sults
In this section, we illustrate the application of the econometric ide as discusse d earlier to the open-ende d data sets from our CVM surveys. Table 1 show s the distrib ution of the depen den t variable for the tw o samples strati®ed by w he ther or not the responde nt reported their in come. The Bre adalbane sample consists of 302 resp onden ts and The M achair sample consists of 358 res ponden ts. In both areas a substantial num ber of resp onden ts did not report their income. M ore speci®cally , in Breadalb ane 274 responde nts or 90.7% of the sample reported their income. In The M achair the proportion of resp onden ts reportin g their income w as lowerÐ only 288 res ponden ts or 80.4% of the sample.
W ith res pect to the type of bid m ade (i.e. protest, zero or positive ), Table 1 sh ow s that 32.8% of resp onses in the Breadalb ane sam ple and 25.1% of the res ponses in The M achair sample were positive bids (see the last column in Table 1 ). Likew ise , ge nuine zero bids m ade up 21.5% and 25.1% of the response s in the Breadalbane and M achair samples res pectively. Fin ally, protest bids were the most popular resp onse, m aking up 45.7% and 49.7% of resp onses in the Breadalb ane and M achair samples, respectively. Protest bids were disting uished from gen uine zero bids by asking responde nts w hy they were unw illing to pay for the ESA programme. Those replyin g eithe r that it w as of no w orth to them, or that they could not afford it, were classi®ed as ge nuine zeros. Other responses, includin g non-responses , were classi®ed as protests. Those people w ho answere d that they ªdid not know º w hether they w ould be w illin g to pay were also classi®ed as protests. This is somew hat unusual in C VM, since such person s are usually excluded from the analysis. H owever, we chose to model them as protests. This leads to quite a high level of protestin g in this study (compared , for example, w ith ®gures of 6% ±14% (H anley & Milne , 1996) ; 6.5% (MacM illan et al., 1996) and 22% (H anle y & C raig, 1991) in other UK open-ended CVM studies). Rem oving these people and those giving no reason for their zero bid give s lower protest ratesÐ 33% for Breadalbane and 31% for The M achair. The most popular reasons given for protes ting were: ªPeople should not have to pay for the programmeº (41 responses) and; ªGovern men t sh ould pay from lottery fundsº (27 person s). We note that the proportion of positive bidders in the DC desig n w as much lower, at 6±25% depen ding on sub-sam ple. Table 1 also sh ow s how the type of bid m ade varie s w ith in come non-response. A com paris on of the distrib utions between groups w ith respect to the type of bid m ade provides some in form ation that su gges ts there is a relationship betw een in com e n on-response and type of bid m ade. M ore speci®cally , com parin g the colum n percen tage s in Table 1 in dicates th at respondents w ho refuse to answ er the in come question appear to have a highe r tendency to rep ort ge nuin e zero and protest bids com p ared to responden ts w ho report their in come (i.e. 96.4% com p ared to 64.2% in Bread alb ane and 82.9% compared to 72.9% in The M achair). G iven the d ifferen ces in these d istrib utions, it is unlike ly th at in com e n on-reporters are a ra nd om su b-sam p le of all respondents. T his m ake s the exp licit m odellin g of a selection process all the m ore relevan t he re. Table 2 
Scotlan d ).

A ge
The age of the ind ividual in ye ars.
M a il
A dum m y variable coded 1 if the individual w as interviewe d via a m ail-shot and coded 0 othe rw ise (i.e. in personal interview ).
V isit
A d um m y variab le coded 1 if the individual h as visited the site before an d code d zero if othe rw ise.
L an d Pref
Ran k orde r score of prefe ren ce me asure relating to the ªim portance of protecting land scapeº (see text).
E n vP re f
Ran k orde r score of prefe ren ce me asure relating to the ªim portance of protecting en viron me nt an d coun trysideº (see text).
A n im P re f
Ran k order score of prefe rence m easure relatin g to the ªim portance of protecting rare anim als and plantsº (see text).
H istP ref
Ran k orde r score of prefe ren ce me asure relating to the ªim portance of protecting h istorical sitesº (see text).
A cce ssP ref
Ran k order score of preferen ce me asure relating to the ªim portance of e nsuring pub lic access to the countrysideº (see text). E n vG rou p N um be r of en viron me ntal groups of w h ich the ind ividual is a mem be r.
environ mental improvemen ts. By in cluding such variables in the bid curve, it is possible to test w hether , on statistical sign i®cance ground s, this is indeed so. Fin ally, survey design dum my variables are often also in cluded to test for des ign effects; he re, the only des ign effect teste d for is the effect of collecting data from mail sh ots as opposed to in-person survey s (M ail). Table 3 sh ow s means an d sta nd ard devia tion s for the varia bles lis ted in T able 2. For each E SA there are three colum n s. T he third colum n (i.e. (3) an d (6)) rep orts the descriptive statistics for all respondents, regardless of w he ther or not they reported their income (n ote therefore that no mean or stan dard deviation is reported for the in come variable). The second colum n (i.e. (2) and (5)) sh ow s the descriptive statistics for on ly those respondents w ho rep orted their in come (i.e. in come n on-respondents are excluded in the calculation of the sum m ary statistics). Fin ally , the ®rst colum n (i.e. (1) an d (4)) show s the descriptive statistics for those respondents w ho rep orted their incom e and m ade ge nuin e zero or positive bid s (i.e. in come n on-respondents and protest bid ders are excluded). T he ke y poin t to note about th is table is th at com parin g across the colum n s reveals that, for m any of the variables, these su m m ary statistics are quite d ifferent, w hich sugge sts furthe r th at in come non-reportin g and protest bid din g is like ly not a rand om process. Table 4 reports estim ates of the bid curves usin g different methods. N ote that these equations exclude the en vironm en tal preferen ce variables included in the selection equation, since we have chosen to specify these as in¯uencing the choice of w he ther to protest or not, rather than in¯uencing the magn itude of 
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positive W TP bids . The table show s the estim ated paramete rs, along w ith the ratio of the parameters to their stand ard errors : s is the scale paramete r of the Tobit m odel; r is the correlation between the errors in the selection equation (not reported he re) and the bid curve. N ote that the selection equation and the Tobit models are in practice estim ated jointly; to avoid confusion we report only the latter. For the Tobit m odels, the R 2 values are like lih ood ratio based pseudo-R 2 values. For each region, there are four columns of estim ates. The ®rst column (i.e. (1) and (5)) is an O LS equation estim ated usin g in formation on only those resp ondents w ho tender a gen uine zero or positive bid and report their income. That is, no inform ation relating to protes t biddin g and income non-reportin g is included in the estimation of the bid curve . In this sense , the ®rst column illustrates the most com mon w ay that bid curve s are estim ated. The second column (i.e. (2) and (6)) is a Tobit equation estim ated usin g the same sample. The only differen ce there fore between the ®rst and second column is that information relating to the censoring at zero is used in the estim ation of the bid curve . The third column (i.e. (3) and (7)) is a Tobit model w ith sample selection w hich includes those resp onden ts w ho tende r protest bids in the estim ation but excludes those res ponden ts w ho do not report their income. In this model, information on in come non-reporting is not included in the estim ation of the bid curve . Fin ally, the fourth column (i.e. (4) and (8)) is a Tobit m odel w ith sam ple selection w hich includes both those res ponden ts w ho tender protest bids and those responde nts w ho do not report their income in the estim ation. There fore, this m odel uses inform ation relatin g to both income non -reporting and protest bidding to assist in the estim ation of the bid curve, and is the`full information' version of our competing models. (2)). L ike w ise , for T he M achair, bein g a residen t of Englan d (Eng land), as opposed to Scotland , is statistically sign i®cant in the O L S equation but n ot in any of the T obit equations. T he d istin ction betw een w he ther resp on ses w ere collected by m ail sh ot or by face-to-face in terview (M ail) is show n to be statistically in signi®can t: given the reasonable respon se rates also achieved for the m ail shot, th is perh ap s sugge sts that the N O A A panel recom men dation again st usin g m ail sh ots sh ould be reconsid ered , given a w ell-desig ned and produced surve y in stru ment.
Comparing across the columns of Tobit estim ates in Table 4 sugge sts that income is the most important dete rm inant of w illin gness to pay. In all the Tobit equations, the in come variable (Income) is high ly statistically sign i®cant (1% level or below ). This is especially the case for The M achair, w he re few of the other included explanatory variables achieve statistical signi®cance, even at the ge ne rous 10% level. It is also important to note that, for both The M achair and Breadalb ane , the parameter on in come increases w he n the sim ple OLS model is com pared w ith the full-information Tobit model w ith selection: this effect is much large r for the M achair than for Bre adalbane, doublin g the parameter in the former case (a sign i®cant change ). Finally , Table 5 sh ow s the M cDonald & M of®tt decomposition of the Tobit res ults. As discussed above, this procedure decomposes the impact of a m argin al change in , say, in come in to tw o com ponents. The ®rst componen t is the im pact of a variable or a combination of variables on the probability of tenderin g a positive bid (column (3)). The second com ponen t is the impact on the magn itude of W TP, give n the decision to bid positive (column (4)). The upper panel of Table  5 sh ow s the decomposition for an equi-margina l change in all depe nde nt variables, w hen they are in itially set at their mean values. The lower pane l sh ow s the effect of changing in come alone , holding all other righ t-hand side variables constant.
Consider in g pane l A ®rst, it may be noted that the breakd ow n of the overall res ponse of W TP is roughly consisten t across all six models, in that approximately 45% of the effect takes place on the probability of being a positive bidder, w hilst about 55% of the effect is on the amount people are w illin g to pay once they have decided to pay some thin g. Pane l B sh ow s that this pattern holds for the case w hen income alone is changed . This show s that sim ply interpreting the income coef®cient in the Tobit m odel of W TP w ould lead to over-estim ating elasticitie s (de®ne d as the percen tage increase in positive W TP for any individual due to a 1% increase in in come) by around 45% . By w ay of example, for The M achair, the estim ated elasticity of W TP w ith respect to income is 1 0.87 based on the Tobit m odel (Table 4 , column (8)). Allow in g for the decomposition , this value changes to 1 0.49. model (column (4)) is lower at 1 0.43 once the decomposition has been allowed for, sin ce not decomposin g the parameter w ould increase the elasticity to 1 0.773.
C onclusions
In this paper w e have conside red tw o econometric iss ues in the estim ation of bid curve s from C V M su rve ys. O ne is con cern ed w ith selection: that the form ulation of w illin gne ss to p ay am oun ts is corre ctly m odelle d in a ne sted fashion , usin g selection m odels. Selection occurs w he n respondents decide w he ther to protest or else tender a ge n uine zero or positive bid. Selection can also be used to take account of the fact th at in come is a m iss ing observation for a num ber of resp on dents, due to a n on-ra nd om p attern of in come non-reportin g on estim ation. That W T P is also a censored variable nee d s to be in corporated in to the m odel too. Second , w e sh ow ed how the p aram eter estim ates that emerge from T obit m odellin g can be decom posed into effects on the p rob ability of bein g a positive bidder, and the size of W TP for su ch positive bid ders. N eglectin g this decom position could lead analysts to over-estim ate in come elasticities (an d does in our em pirical exam ple). W hilst the im p act of specifyin g a selection m odel ra ther than a sim ple O L S m odel is n ot very great for the d ata set used in th is paper, this does not of course m ean that th is w ill be so for other d ata sets.
Th is paper has also been about the application of C V M to one aspect of agri-environm ental p olicy in the U K , nam ely the ESA sche me. Previou s C VM an alyses of other U K E SA s (for exam ple, W illis et al., 1993; G ourlay, 1996; B ullock & Kay, 1996) have also found that users an d non-users w ere W T P signi®cant am ounts for sim ilar environmental bene ®ts. For ex am ple, W illis e t al., found that res idents h ad a mean W TP of £27.52/household/ye ar for the South D ow ns E SA and £17.53 for the Somerse t Levels E SA ; w hils t G ourlay found a reside n ts' mean W T P of £20.60/household/ye ar for L och L om on d E SA , and £13.00 for Stew artry E SA . These ®gures, all obtaine d usin g O E desig ns, are very com parable to the estim ates obtaine d he re for B read alb ane an d T he M achair. Referrin g to Bread alb ane an d The M achair speci®cally , then aggreg ating over just resid ents and estim ated visitors , revea ls a total bene®t ®gure in each case w ell in excess of program me costs.
9 For Breadalb ane , th is (reside nts plus visitors ) total bene ®t is £1.046 m illion /ye ar; for The M achair, it is £329 790/ye ar. Th us, on cost±bene ®t analysis grou nd s, there is a good case for m ain tain in g the E SA p rogram m e in both these areas, even if the very large non-use values associated w ith them are ignored . Includ in g non-use values greatly in creases total W TP, sin ce the sam ple w as d raw n from the entire popula tion of the U K . T his paper m igh t be see n, then, as providin g furthe r eviden ce of the econom ic desirability , on ef®ciency grou nd s, of aspects of E U agri-environm ental policy. Finally , one migh t ask w hat im plications the paper has for the desig n of future C VM studies. W e sugge st that data collection and subseque nt m odellin g nee ds to be extended so that the analyst can explain: (1) w hat dete rm ine s w hether an ind ivid ual is able to answer the W TP question at all; (2) w hat dete rm ine s w hether they protest, or else tender a ge nuine zero or positive bid; (3) assumin g they do not protest, w hat dete rm ine s w he ther they tender a positive bid or a ge nuine zero; and (4) assum ing they tender a positive bid, w hat determ ines how Downloaded by [University of Kent] at 03:43 07 January 2014
Estimating the Bene ®ts of A gri-environm ental Policy 41 high this bid is. This implie s deciding at an early stage to collect data w hich can address each part of this value formulation/statemen t process, for example data on ethical belie fs w ith regard to protestin g. M uch bid curve analysis in CVM is aimed solely at question (4), w ith positive bids only bein g used in the regres sion (this is especially likely if the popular sem i-log (depende nt) functional form is speci®ed). A llow ing ge nuine zeros along w ith positive bids in an O LS framew ork w ill not, however, ans wer any of the other three questions. Selection models seem a promisin g w ay forw ards in this reg ard. and migh t be com pared w ith the nes ted multi-nomial logit models now becomin g popular in recreational demand studie s using random utility approaches. In addition, the decom position we have sugge sted allow s for more accurate measures of the in come elasticity of dem and for environ mental goods.
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